Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem by Kelso, Robert W.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 16 
Issue 3 June 1951 Article 2 
1951 
Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem 
Robert W. Kelso 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Kelso, Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem, 16 MO. L. REV. (1951) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss3/2 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE
SMALL LOAN PROBLEM
ROBERT W. KELSO*
In the long lapse of years since that day in 1545 when King Henry
VIII decreed the legality of interest for money lent' and fixed a maximum
rate therefor, the English speaking world has sought to fix the rate of in-
terest for all lending. It was a tenet of the medieval church that all charge
for money lent was unconscionable, the older distinction between usurious
charges and fair dealing having been lost sight of.2 And to this day, gov-
ernments seek to defeat usury by fixing the price of credit at a set maxi-
mum of something like 6% per annum regardless of the risk incurred in
the lending.
Only within the past thirty five years has state wide regulation of
money lending in small sums been inaugurated in the U. S. Those thirty
five years have well demonstrated the practicable method of such regula-
tion. Much has been written on that phase of the subject. But seldom
if ever is real thought given to the social and economic justification of
regulation of any kind.
It is the purpose of this article to point out, not the details of modern
regulatory method, but rather the social and economic background of this
aspect of consumer credit. Is there a genuine need for credit? Does the
borrower of a small loan profit by securing it from a source that is regulated
by law? Does society benefit by such regulatory practice? If these ques-
tions can be answered in the affirmative there is small justification for
allowing the practice of lending in small sums to go without safeguards.
Is THERE A NEED FOR CREDIT?
Is there a positive need for this kind of credit? Many instances can
be found where impecunious borrowers seek loans that thrift would have
rendered unnecessary. The applicant wishes to make some improvident
purchase or to meet bills for purchases that need never have been made.
But these instances will be found on close examination of the whole prob-
*Formerly Director, Institute of Social Work, University of Michigan; direc-
tor, St. Louis Community Chest and Community Council (1929-1932); author of
books and articles on Welfare Subjects.
1. 37 HEN. VIII, c. 9 (1545).
2, See KELSO, SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE SMALL LOAN BusiNEss IN U. S.,
U. of Mich. Institute of Social Work, Studies, No. 1 (1947).
(197)
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lem to be a small minority of applicants for loans and a still smaller pro-
portion of actual borrowers.
There has never been a time, perhaps, since the Cromagnon that man
has not found himself in need of the wherewith to sustain life and yet with-
out means of securing it. And it is the modern age of cash economy that
has vastly increased such hardships. When man lived mostly upon the
soil, taking his living therefrom his needs were relatively few. With the
coming of the machine age which has taken the householder off the soil
and grounded his livelihood in a pay slip, the uncertainties of the job
and therefore the insecurity of the home have been greatly magnified.
The individual tied to a job of work lives in a sort of financial straight
jacket, in which if his pay fails for ever so short a time he must ask leniency
of his creditor or seek charity. His need for tide-over help is greatly
augmented.
Let us inquire first, who this borrower is, in our modern machine age.
Statistical studies3 reveal him to be a family man in about nine cases out of
ten. He is the head of an average sized family. His age is somewhere between
30 and 40 years. Back in 1938-1939 he was earning between $1200 and
$1600 a year. At present he will be earning more in nominal dollars but
he will be receiving little more in real wages. His take-home pay, after
deducting for lay offs, strikes, illness and the like will be small. He is a
fellow of steady habits with a good work record. He is of good character
in his neighborhood.' He seldom has any tangible assets to offer as se-
curity-a small life insurance policy in some cases. His wife often comes
with him to apply for the loan.
So, contrary to the popular stereotype that has persisted for centuries,
until research has revealed the truth, this average borrower is a family man,
seeking a loan with which to meet family crises.
Our next question is why does the lower income family man in the
United States'need credit? To find the answer it is necessary to examine
American home economics through census and other statistics. The U. S.
census for 1950 reports that the medium American family income was
$3100 in 1949; that eight million .families had incomes above $5000 a year,
while ten million had less than $2000 and nearly five million had less than
3. See ROBINSON AND STEARNS, TEN THOUSAND SMALL LOANS c. II (Russell
Sage Foundation, 1930).
4. SIMPSON, THE SMALL LOAN PROBLEM OF rTE CAROLINAS pp. 14ff. (Clin-
ton, S. C. Presbyterian Coil. Press, 1941).
[Vol. 16
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$1000.5 Statistics of regulated small loan companies indicate that most
small loan borrowers have incomes between $1000 and $2500, with the
present value of the dollar at a low ebb. This maximum approaches $3000.
Still one of the largest chains reports for 1949 that a list of more than one
million loans showed approximately 50 per cent were borrowed by indi-
viduals with less than $3000 annual income," Families earning below
$2500 a year have no savings. 7
In a careful field study made in 1939 of conditions in South Carolina,
a state without a regulatory law, Professor Simpson of Duke University in-
terviewed 2223 borrowers. More than half worked in cotton mills. Better
than 60 per cent had work records extending over five years. The need for
borrowing varied directly with the number of the borrower's dependents.
About two thirds of the group sought their loans to defray living expenses.
Some 30 per cent sought to refinance existing indebtedness. Borrowings
were small in all cases.8
As a further evidence of inadequate family budgets, an analysis of the
purported uses of borrowing by the 259,321 borrowers from small loan
companies in New York State in 1936, revealed 20 plus per cent sought to
consolidate existing debts; just under 15 per cent to meet medical and
dental expenses; 15 per cent needed clothing and fuel, though less than
3 per cent needed food and rent.
The Pennsylvania department of Banking reported the total number of
borrowers from legal small loan agencies together with an analysis of pur-
poses offered by borrowers as follows-clothing 6 plus percent, medical and
dental 11 per cent, fuel 4 plus per cent, to meet current debts, 12 plus per
cent.
One of the largest lending agencies now under regulatory laws, re-
ported for 1949 that reasons offered, and accepted by the lenders, show some
40 per cent were the consolidation of existing debts while clothing, rent and
5. As of Dec. 1950, the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics reports income of
the American city dwelling family of 4 persons to range from $2532, in Houston,
Texas, to $2985 in Washington, D. C. But the Bureau of National Affairs computes
the comparable figures for a family of 3 persons as ranging, in 34 cities, from $3120'
in New Orleans to $3762 in Seattle. The same Bureau reports as of October, 19S0,
that the city workers' family budget for a family of 4 persons ranged from $3453
in New Orleans to $3926 in Washington, D. C. The index of intercity price dif-
ference rose from 87 in June 1947 in Houston and Kansas City to 100 in Milwaukee
and Washington, D. C. See Bureau report 17.95 .
6. See also NEIFELD , Tnis PERSONAL FINANcE BusINEss pp. 154ff. (1933).
7. LEviN, MOULTON, AND WMIBURTON, AMERicA's CAPAcrry To SAVE pp.
154ff., 101 (The Brookings Institution, 1943).
8. SiMPSON, op. cit. s pra n. 4, pp. 7ff.
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-medical bills accounted for 20 per cent more. Taxes and repairs Covered
-another 10 per cent. The analysis covered more than a million loans. The
broad conclusion to be gained from these analyses is that the necessaries
eof daily living are the great and compelling reason for seeking small loans
.by the family man who cannot secure them without credit.
If then the lower income families in America have only breadwinners'
-wages to maintain the budget it is obvious that sudden emergencies cannot
,,e met without credit or charitable help. That crises do arise, and frequent-
ly, is likewise obvious-the birth of a child, a death, a fire, a long continued
.strike or lay-off, or sickness-these either stop the income completely or
fix a drain upon it that cannot presently be borne.9
WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PUBLIC REGULATION?
If we assume that the borrower of a small loan is in the average a
family man of small income with no assets to offer as security and only his
reputation and his job to commend him, we still face the question whether
-this is not a matter between him and the lender. What right or duty have
the public to step in?
Ever since mankind has realized that the family, as home and breeding
lair, is the basic unit of race culture and race propagation, the laws that
.man sets over himself have been gauged to protect the fireside. The laws of
marriage and divorce regiment the mating process severely. Granting to the
householder the right to protect his home to the point of extremity is another
.of these safeguards. The nation's far-flung mother's assistance program in
'child conservation, keeping the child in his own home where possible, is also
a part of this cloak thrown about the economically distressed home. The
:schemes of made work in time of unemployment are designed not only to feed
the hungry workman, but primarily to feed his dependents and keep his
family together. To stand at the shoulder of the family man who is in hard
:straits for family support yet without bargaining power, to see that he has
fair treatment, would seem to be no more than a minimum of public con-
-cern for his welfare and that of his wife and children.
Far back into the earliest times the man of small means has been prayed
upon by those who would make even a little profit out of his extremity,
'Superficial thinking might conclude that this condition has obtained only
.because human nature is selfish and man will take advantage of his fellow.
9. For an extended discussion of this point see NEIFELD, op. cit. .s pra n, 3,
.. 191ff.
:200 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW (Vol. 16
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In all probability the reason lies deeper. Granting human cupidity at its
full, the usurer has existed through all times because he meets an economic
need-the necessity for tide-over. The potential borrower is therefore al-
ways present wherefore the usurer who would meet his present need but
exact an unfair price therefor, to be paid out of the borrower's future, is
-ever ready to render assistance. With no bargaining power the small income
householder falls a ready victim. It is this situation that justifies public
protection through regulatory law which provides an economic substitute
for the usurer and subjects the business of lending and borrowing to super-
vision by government authority.
DOES THE BORROWER PROFIT RY THIS LEGAL PROTEcTIoN?
Reasonably adequate regulation exists in all but a few states. So exten-
sive is this coverage that about three fourths of our families live under these
regulatory laws.10 If the borrower gains in money and in protection against
usurious treatment, that is to be discovered by a comparison of treatment
received in unregulated areas and that accorded him under adequate legal
protection. Kansas and South Carolina, both unregulated territory, are re-
vealing examples of lending without safeguards.
A small but intensive study in Kansas of 107 cases showed instances
of illegal charges at their worst. Rates in some instances reached 5000 per
-cent a year. The common range was between 1000 and 2000 per cent.
The highest rate allowed under the uniform small loans law is 42 per cent
a year or 3 /2 per cent per month on the unpaid balance when the loan is $50
or less, and a rate graduated downward for larger loans."
In the South Carolina study, Simpson found the borrowers of small
sums in a deplorable state of bondage to the usurer. The average annual rate
-of interest on small loans of various sizes ranged from 278 per cent to white
borrowers on loans of $10 or less to 598 per cent. The corresponding per-
centages for loans between $10 and $25 were 224 and 362. For loans between.
$25 and $50, percentages were 40 and 216. On loans to negro borrowers rates
-were one fourth to one half higher. 2
Such conditions are common throughout unregulated territory. Thus,
in a survey made by the Better Business Institute of Huntington, West Vir-
10. See SMALL LOAN LAws OF THE U. S., Pollak Foundation Pamphlet #37(1947).
11. For an able discussion of illegal lending, see HARDr, CONSUMER CREDIT
AND rrs UsEs c. VII, pp. 73ff. (1938).
12. SIMPSON Op. dt. supra, n. 11, pp. 21-28.
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ginia, in 1929, at a time when no regulatory law was in effect in that state,
it was found that about $120,000 a year was being paid by factory employees
to loan sharks. Charges actually collected ranged from 240 to 340 per cent-
in some cases as high as 1000 per cent.13
A common practice in unregulated territory in the South takes the form
of a sale by the borrower to the lender of his next pay check, which he agrees
to buy back at next pay day with a premium. If he cannot pay the whole
amount on the appointed day he must sell another pay check. This process
goes on from week to week, often for years on end. Salary buying was es-
pecially flagrant in Georgia. The charge there was usually $1 on each $10.
The borrower must go on renewing his agreement and paying his premium
until such time as he could find enough cash to discharge the principal with
the premium.
But if the amount of charge seems outrageous, the collection methods
used by illegal lenders are, if anything, worse. The borrower is threatened
with loss of his job. He is dunned at the factory gate in the presence of his
fellow workmen. He is hounded through his neighborhood. He is threatened
with criminal prosecution for embezzlement. Garnishment all too frequently
results in the borrower's discharge from his job.1 4
By contrast with these methods, a steadily increasing volume of evi-
dence found in the reports of state banking departments that carry super-
vision under a regulatory loan law, shows fair treatment of the borrower.
Legal lenders are required by the law
(1) To obtain a license to operate from the state.
(2) To file a bond of an amount stated in the statute.
(3) To limit the size of loans within a fixed maximum.
(4) To limit charges (called interest and outlay for services and ex-
penses) to a definite maximum.
'(5) To submit a regular supervision and inspection by a state official.
(6) To keep adequate records, open to inspection.
(7) To charge interest only on the unpaid balance with the right irr
the borrower to pay the whole balance at any time during the life
of the loan.
That legal lending agencies are living up to these requirements in full
measure is indicated by impartial reports of state banking departments.
13. HAmmY, op. cit. supra, n. 11, p. 74.
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Some of the largest chains issue bulletins with helpful advice on family buy-
ing and budgeting. Lenders seek to maintain a helpful and friendly relation-
ship to their clients. Associations of the companies maintain committees
jointly with welfare agencies, which seek to handle borderline cases where
the welfare workers find need of forbearance in loan collections. Seldom is
representation necessary to stay foreclosure on the borrower's property where
he has given it as security. An overall survey of 4,115,224 loans made in
eleven states15 for which data was available shows repossession of house-
hold goods in .026 per cent of the total. Of these 1075 repossessions only 210
or .005 per cent were by legal process for goods being used by the borrower.
Voluntary surrender accounted for 655 or .016 per cent. Automobiles were
repossessed in .293 per cent of the cases; and other chattels in .009 per cent.
Total possession of all chattels were had in 13,543 out of the 4,115,224 of
which only 4599 were by legal process. It is apparent from this analysis that
most small cash loans are character loans, and also that lenders appear to
carry on their traffic with a high degree of consideration for their clients.
The illegal lender operates outside the law and charges all that the
traffic will bear. His loans are usually of small size and must be paid within
a period too short for the hard pressed borrower to meet. In the South this is
called the "short loan" business. The result is a new loan to cover the old.
The borrower winds up by paying on his original loan many times its full
face value and an exorbitant amount of interest and charge besides.
It would seem to be a justifiable conclusion that the borrower is better
off under the protection of the standard small loan statutes than he has been
when at the mercy of the illegal lender.
DOES THE PUBLic BENEFIT BY REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN PROBLEM?
Benefits to the public, if there be any, cannot be expressed in dollars.
They must be found in greater stability of our national institutions; in
greater equities in human relations; in a finer quality of American citizen-
ship-a greater pride, it may be, in cleanness of living, less shame, akin to
the shame of the nation when it tolerated slavery. These are intangibles.
They are nevertheless real. It remains to find whether they exist.
It can be seen easily that many of the several million borrowers of small
sums each year would have come to public relief if they could not have
secured tide over credit. In a special spot study of 100 cases in the Detroit
U5. California, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin.
1951]
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area, more than one third of the cases had been in receipt of public relief.1,
It is some benefit to the public that the funds do not have to be paid out for
the support of this fraction of the clientele of the legal small loan agencies.
But it is a far greater benefit to the community that as many citizens as
possible be kept from the need to seek charitable relief; that the citizen
preserves as far as may be his independence as the head of a family. De-
pendent individuals are apt to be poor citizens'--men largely without hope,
families largely without a future.
There is arguable gain to the public, also, in the establishment and
maintenance of a legitimate loan business, running into sizable volume. Le-
gitimate lenders are known as "the poor man's banker." Some 85 per cent of
all the public have no banking connections. They could not secure a loan
because they have no security to offer. The commercial bank handles de-
positors money in trust. It must lend on security. Now that our banks have
gone into the business of lending small sums, they are affording some advan-
tage to the lower income families, but examination will show that loans made
by the banks are larger in amount than the average of those made by the
small loan companies. While commercial banks are rendering a valuable and
increasing service to the working man and his family, it is the family man
who must find $100 or less who is most important in this problem. It is
important to the public that transactions so dangerously one-sided are
brought under public supervision, thus safeguarding the lack of bargaining
power.
Nor is'it a small advantage to the public that the usurer should be
driven out of his predatory occupation. There is no place for him in honest
living. If he could run his business on an honest basis, charging for his loans
what his effort justifies and no more, he could be welcomed to any com-
munity. The family is in need of credit. It is a foregone conclusion, however,
that the shark would continue to play Shylock. The only recourse is to
eliminate him and replace him with an economic substitute, a legitimate,
carefully supervised lending business.
To effect this change would go a long way toward setting an example to
honest business. Governments maintain police and other officials at great
expense to track down individuals who prey upon their fellows. The loan
shark has been one variety of unfair dealer who until recent years went un-
16. Maslan, Some Family Welfare Aspects of the Small Loan Business, cited
in KELSO, op. cit. supra, n. 2, pp. 19-21.
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checked. His victims have been left to civil rights which they were helpless;
to enforce. Usury, by whatever name, is duress and extortion, long inter--
dicted by the law. Now at last has been found a constructive way to deal.
with it. With continuing oversight the lending business can be kept on a-
basis of fair dealing.
But the greatest advantage the public can gain from the new regime im
lending is greater guarantees of solidarity for the American family. There
can be no doubt that small loans serve in many thousands of -nstances to-
head off the break up of families.
SUMMARY
The borrower .of a small loan in the United States is in the average a
man with a family of dependents. His income is small, ranging somewhere:
below $2500 a year-seldom reaching beyond $3000. He is a fellow of good
reputation in his neighborhood, has a respectable work record. He does not
know much about budgeting his income and too often gets himself into debt-
for the many things the family needs and other things they could, with some
privation, do without. His greatest need is for a small sum to meet his emer--
gency.
Down to about 1916 there was no protection for this borrower other-
than the ancient 6 per cent rule which was not observed. Rate is related to-
risk and effort and expense, not to a moral dictate established by statute.
Beginning in that year the Russell Sage Foundation with the assistance of'
social work interests and many of the existing loan companies brought out a
so-called model small loan regulatory law. It took account of the experience
of some states that had tried some sort of regulation as early as 1911.
This model statute has been adopted in most of our states. It has now-
reached a seventh edition, and is reasonably workable. Its adoption has so:
far reformed the small loan business that the so-called "shark"--the usurer
has had to retreat to an ever narrowing expanse of unregulated territory.
So at long last, the old era of prohibition of lending at more than ant
uneconomical and traditionally established rate has given way in America to-
a new era of regulation and supervision of a recognized business. Six basic-
concepts are to be noted in the new legal attitude toward small loan lending-
They are-
(1) Small loan lending is a public necessity.
(2) The regulatory law must allow the business to be conducted on a.
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(3) Charges for lending must be above the conventional banking rate
for larger loans, at least large enough to meet the expenses and overhead
services called for to handle installment loans.
(4) To protect the borrower the lender must be supervised and regu-
lated by the public.
(5) The regulatory law must cover all small cash lending and should
set a maximum in its definition of a "small loan."
(6) Penalties for violation of the provisions of the law must be heavy
enough to ensure observance.
Under such limitations the lender can carry on a respectable business,
comparable in profits to general business in his community, while the bor-
rower can seek a loan, however small, with full knowledge of what he has
to pay back and with the assurance that he will not be taken at an unfair
advantage.
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